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Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Record and Future 
Trends 
MARTIN HVIDT 
Abstract 
Employing an empirical and comparative approach, this research paper analyses the past 
record and future trends of economic diversification efforts in the six Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries. Applying the methodology of content analysis, possible future 
diversification trends are studied from current development plans and national visions 
published by the GCC governments. 
The past record of diversification has yielded only meagre results. Current 
development plans point unanimously to diversification as the means to secure the 
stability and the sustainability of income levels in the future. Even though the states 
continue to lead the economies, diversification entails a reinvigoration of the private 
sector and as such necessitates the implementation of broader reforms. 
The paper, however, questions the likelihood of diversification plans being 
translated into action. There are a number of structural barriers to diversification, which 
relate to the growth scenarios for the world economy, the duplication of economic 
activities among the GCC states, and, not least, the sizable barriers to interregional trade. 
Furthermore, the policy response to pre-empt the Arab Spring uprising indicates that 
these regimes easily give up their well-argued and planned policies when under pressure 
and fall back on established ways of doing business, namely through patronage and the 
predominant role of the public sector. Hence, the prospect of diversifying economies 
through politically difficult economic reforms has suffered a significant setback. This 
conclusion, however, does not rule out a piecemeal and ad hoc implementation of the 
diversification strategies in the future. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are several reasons to study economic diversification as it unfolds in the Gulf states. As 
pointed out by Kubursi, ‘Were oil supplies everlasting, and the demand for oil strong and 
continuous, economic diversification would be pointless. The governments of the region 
would instead need only to ensure the distribution of oil revenues among the population’ 
(Kubursi 1984: 1). However, in the real world, oil resources are finite and experience shows 
that both the price of and the demand for oil have fluctuated considerably. A second factor that 
has brought diversification to the forefront of economic policy in the Gulf region is the simple 
fact that oil revenues quickly crowd out any other economic activity. As Beblawi phrases it:  
the Gulf states’ drama is that it [oil extraction] is not simply another economic activity added 
to the other existing productive sources within a viable and modern economy, as it is with the 
Netherlands or, for that matter, Canada, Australia, and the Scandinavian countries. In the 
Gulf, the oil sector dominates the economy; it is almost the unique source of wealth. (2011: 
188) 
2 
These three factors – income from hydrocarbons is finite, fluctuates and is practically the only 
source of the wealth – have placed the issue of economic diversification on the political 
agenda in the Gulf countries since oil was discovered. 
 The political emphasis on diversification seems to have fluctuated inversely with the 
incomes from oil and gas, such that low oil prices spurred strong political emphasis on 
diversification. The boom years (2000–8) were atypical in the sense that the diversification 
drive coincided with a period of high incomes. 
 Currently, Arab Gulf states seem not only to give political priority to economic 
diversification, but also to pursue such a strategy in real terms. Reviewing official statements, 
actual investments and projects under implementation by the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
[UAE]) shows this.  
 It is plausible that the recent political focus on diversification is motivated by multiple 
problems which arise from the developmental issues particular to the oil- and gas-driven 
economies of the GCC states. This ‘allocation state’ model (defined in greater detail below) 
relies on the sale of hydrocarbons, is state-led and state-driven, emphasizes wealth 
distribution, makes extensive use of migrant labour, and is characterized by a significant 
underdevelopment of productive assets. This model therefore fails to support further 
development of the GCC states in two important respects. First, it fails to generate a stable and 
sufficient income for the population; and second, it fails to create job opportunities for the 
swiftly growing group of young and well-educated citizens (Hvidt 2011a: 88). 
 Economic diversification is, however, not a new strategy among the GCC states. It has 
been on the political agenda since oil and gas became the main and almost sole source of 
income in these countries some half a century ago (Henry and Springborg 2001: 26ff; Hvidt 
2007; McBrierty and Al Zubair 2004: 116ff.; Niblock and Malik 2007; Rivlin 2009: 218ff.; 
Seznec and Kirk 2011). Notable projects like aluminium smelting in Bahrain, the industrial 
cities of Yanbu and Jubail in Saudi Arabia, and the ports in Dubai were established in the 
1970s with the specific aim of diversifying the economies by means of investing oil money in 
productive assets. 
1.1. Research questions 
Employing an empirical and comparative approach, this paper will analyse the economic 
diversification programmes undertaken in the GCC countries. More specifically, it aims to 
provide a comparative assessment of the most recent development plans or national visions 
3 
published in each of the GCC states, through an analysis of how the plans relate to each other 
(similarities and differences) and how they contribute to broader prospects for diversification 
in each country. 
 This analysis will deal with two issues believed to be of importance for the drive 
towards diversification and thus future development trajectories in the GCC states. First, it 
will inquire into the specific economic sectors and ‘created comparative advantages’ that each 
state has been or is seeking to implement through its diversification policy (Evans 1995: 8–
9).
1
 Second, it will explore various future roles of the state in the economy and its possible 
impact on development. Strong state involvement in the economy has yielded significant 
developmental results in the Asian economies (Amsden 1989; Economist 2012; Weiss 2000; 
White and Wade 1988; World Bank 1993), while ‘the West’ – from the early 1980s and at 
least until the advent of the financial crisis in 2008 – has advocated a neo-liberal approach, 
based on the market economy and driven by the private sector. 
 Given this, there are different ways to conceptualize the role of the state in an 
economy. This paper will therefore explore whether the diversification effort (as described in 
the development plans) envisions a continuation of current state capitalism or a shift towards 
the ‘western’ neo-liberal model. Furthermore, it analyses what role(s) the private sector is 
expected to play and, not least, the degree to which the plans express a desire to move these 
societies from being allocation states to being production states. 
 Applying Luciani’s distinction between allocation states and production states shows 
the Gulf states as archetypical of the former.
2
 These are characterized by the state being 
largely dislocated from the national economy. Because of the large income from, for example, 
exports of oil, gas or other ‘rents’, the state is not forced to tax the local economy to finance its 
activities. In other words, because the state has these rent incomes, it is not under pressure to 
develop an efficient economic foundation for the society. Rather, it can see its role as that of 
distributing the revenues which flow into the country. In the production state the situation is 
reversed. Here the creation of a solid economic foundation for society determines the state’s 
ability – through taxation – to strengthen its power, both nationally and internationally. As 
such, allocation and production states must be understood as opposite extremes on a 
continuum. 
                                                          
1
 Most value is currently added at several removes from natural resources. ‘Created comparative advantages’ are 
the social and institutional factors that a country creates during the development process which shape the capacity 
of the productive base and its international specialization (Evans 1995: 8–9). 
2
 For an in-depth discussion of allocation and production states see Luciani (1990: 71ff.). 
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 To explore the two issues listed above, the following questions will be asked in order 
to assess differences and similarities among the plans:  
1. What barriers to growth are envisioned in the plans and how should diversification 
overcome them? 
2. What economic sectors are targets for the diversification effort (e.g. industry, trade, 
finance, tourism, oil and gas, logistics, knowledge etc.)? 
3. Who will be the driver of the future economy? State vs. market: who determines 
what and how much is to be produced? Public vs. private sector: who produces? 
4. What type of (economic) state is envisioned in the future (allocation state vs. 
production state)? 
With the exceptions of Saudi Arabia and Oman, which have conducted economic planning for 
nearly four decades, formalized economic planning is a relatively recent phenomenon in the 
countries included in this study. However, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE have recently 
published long-term development plans. 
1.2. Outline of the paper 
Following the above introduction, this paper proceeds with a definition and delimitation of the 
concept of diversification. In section 3, the past record of the diversification effort in the Gulf 
region is described and analysed. In section 4, the main section of this paper, a review of the 
current development plans for all six Gulf countries is undertaken. In section 5, the plans are 
compared (similarities and differences), using the four questions listed above. In section 6, the 
broader prospects of diversification related to the implementation of the plans are analysed. 
2. DIVERSIFICATION: DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION 
The central issue to be dealt with in this paper is the attempt by the Gulf countries to diversify 
their economies away from the near-complete dependence on income from oil and gas. 
2.1. Definition of diversification 
‘Diversification’ is defined in a variety of ways according to the field of application. In 
political economy, the conceptual underpinning of this study, diversification ‘normally refers 
to exports, and specifically to policies aiming to reduce the dependence on a limited number 
of export commodities that may be subject to price and volume fluctuations or secular 
declines’ (Routledge Encyclopedia 2001: 360). Within political economy, diversification can 
take place through either horizontal diversification (new opportunities are sought for new 
5 
products within the same sector, e.g. mining, energy or agriculture) or vertical diversification, 
which entails adding more stages of processing of domestic or imported inputs.
3
 Thus, vertical 
diversification encourages forward and backward linkages in the economy, as the output of 
one activity becomes the input of another, thus upgrading the value-added produced locally.
4
 
Furthermore, vertical diversification entails a shift from one sector or industry to another, and 
generally from the primary to the secondary and tertiary sectors. For example, a mining 
company may expand from just extracting copper to engage in processing, transporting or 
retailing it. Parallel to this, the company shifts from extraction (primary sector) to 
manufacturing, for instance producing electric cables (secondary sector), and finally to 
transport or retail (tertiary sector). It follows that a country may attain three linked objectives 
through diversification: stabilizing earnings, expanding revenues and retaining or increasing 
value-added. 
 Risk is the underlying issue in this definition. Since price and demand fluctuations are 
basic components of the world’s economic system, diversification is one of the options open 
to societies, firms and individual investors to protect themselves from this phenomenon. The 
underlying logic of diversification is that ‘instability for any group of products tends to be 
significantly lower than for any of its constituents, indicating that price and volume stability 
gains are attainable from diversification’ (Routledge Encyclopedia 2001: 360). 
 Risk, however, no matter how important it is, is not the only concern in GCC 
governments’ pursuit of economic diversification. Problems such as low growth rates, lack of 
public and private incentives to accumulate human capital, lack of competiveness in 
manufacturing etc., the likelihood of shocks and spill-over effects in the economies, and 
various rentier effects make it imperative for the countries to pursue economic diversification 
strategies (El-Kharouf et al. 2010: 135ff.).
5
 As stated by the General Secretariat for 
Development Planning in Qatar, ‘A more diversified economy is inherently more stable, more 
capable of creating jobs and opportunities for the next generation and less vulnerable to the 
boom and bust cycles of oil and natural gas prices’ (GSDP 2011: 10). 
2.2. Diversification vs. industrialization 
In the literature on diversification and in the development plans being studied here, the 
concepts of ‘diversification’ and ‘industrialization’ are very often used interchangeably, even 
                                                          
3
 Vertical diversification is also termed diagonal diversification. Throughout this paper the term ‘vertical 
diversification’ will be used. 
4
 For a detailed discussion of forward and backward linkages, see Hirschman (1958 [1969]: 98ff.).  
5
 El-Kharouf et al. (2010: 135–6) provide a detailed literature review of various economic reasons that make a 
diversification strategy imperative for the resource-based GCC states. 
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though – obviously – they carry different meanings. This practice is understandable since a 
diversification process, especially vertical diversification, implies the accumulation of 
productive capacity within either the manufacturing or the service sector. Throughout the post-
1973/4 period a continued effort has been invested in developing a manufacturing sector. As 
Seznec pointed out, ‘it was obvious that because the region’s geography does not permit much 
growth in agricultural jobs, service jobs would be the solution. However, service jobs need 
something to service. Much effort was placed into developing industry, which would create 
manufacturing jobs and in turn many times more service jobs’ (2011b: 2). The Encyclopedia 
Britannica defines industrialization as ‘the process of converting to a socioeconomic order in 
which industry is dominant’. The term industry is there defined as ‘a group of productive 
enterprises or organizations that produce or supply goods, services, or sources of income’. 
 It follows that industrialization is a much broader process than merely establishing 
manufacturing industries.
6
 Industrialization also entails the process of creating service 
industries such as tourism, financial services, insurance, banking, real estate services, 
transportation, restaurants, repair and maintenance services etc. In this way the concepts of 
(vertical) diversification and industrialization become synonymous. The aim of diversification 
is spreading risk by creating a variety of income sources; industrialization in its broadest 
understanding is the process of creating these diverse income sources.
7
 
2.3. Diversification vs. oil sector development 
Given the aim of diversifying away from oil and gas revenues, how can development of the oil 
sector be seen as a part of the diversification strategy? 
 Beblawi (2011: 186) provides a useful distinction. He divides the manufacturing sector 
into two categories: oil-based and import substitution industries. In addition to the extraction 
of oil and gas, the oil-based industries include refineries, the vast petrochemical sector and 
energy-intensive industries such as aluminium. As he points out, oil-based industries are 
usually large-scale and capital-intensive projects and as such generally state owned. 
 The import substitution industries include a diverse set of activities, most commonly 
food processing and the manufacture of construction materials. The latter includes production 
                                                          
6
 Manufacturing industry, again according to the Encyclopedia Britannica, (1) takes the raw materials supplied 
by primary industries and processes them into consumer goods, or (2) further processes goods that other 
secondary industries have transformed into products, or (3) builds capital goods used to manufacture consumer 
and non-consumer goods. Secondary industry includes energy-producing industries (e.g., hydroelectric 
industries) as well as the construction industry. 
7
 In the literature on diversification, especially of earlier date, it seems to be the practice to treat diversification 
merely as the creation of manufacturing industry; see e.g. Looney (1994). 
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of cement, steel, aluminium window frames, building cladding etc. These industries are 
usually small, labour intensive and often privately owned. 
 It is obvious that diversification by expanding the oil industry will not reduce 
dependence on oil and gas, since this industry relies wholly on the low cost and ample supply 
of oil and gas in each of the Gulf countries.
8
 This industry has little prospect of survival in the 
post-oil era.
 
However, processing crude oil (refining) and using gas as feedstock in 
petrochemical plants reduce the risk associated with fluctuations in international oil prices, 
create jobs (however few) and attain a higher value-added – as long as oil is present. 
 Diversification through the establishment of import substitution industries is 
potentially much closer to the original aim of divesting away from oil. It also holds a much 
better prospect of survival after the oil era, if this industry has been accustomed to operate 
under market conditions during the oil era; that is, if it does not rely on favourable production 
conditions provided by the circulation of oil money in society. This, however, does not seem 
to be the case.
9
 
 Diversification within the oil sector, however, by expanding the oil-based industries, 
has been the most notable outcome of efforts in the Gulf states. It has been relatively easy for 
the states to do, given the capital surplus situation and centralized governance structure, as has 
been the case with state-owned cement factories etc. The most difficult type of industry to 
foster has been the private import substitution sector. This cannot be created by decree, but 
necessitates entrepreneurship and private risk taking. 
2.4. Diversification and the private sector/economic reforms 
A related question is whether diversification necessitates increased private sector involvement. 
For example, in its definition of diversification, ESCWA writes, ‘By implication, it 
[diversification] also means reducing the leading role of the public sector in the GCC 
economies by promoting the growth of the private sector’ (2001: vii). 
 One could argue that this need not be the case; state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
organizations are capable of providing productive investments over a broad range of economic 
activities.
10
 If they invest in and operate tourism facilities, manufacturing industries, harbours 
                                                          
8
 As such, this industry cannot convert to imported oil or gas when the domestic oil sources have dried up. 
9
 As pointed out by Beblawi (2011: 185), ‘Over the last three or four decades, most countries in the region have 
invested lavishly in large and high-quality physical infrastructure projects, such as roads, ports, airports, 
electricity, schools, and hospitals. No less generous were governments’ expenditures on social welfare, which 
provided citizens with a wide range of free or low-cost services, such as water, housing, education, and health 
care.’ 
10
 SOEs are defined as ‘Public corporations and parastatal agencies (e.g., agricultural marketing boards) owned 
and operated by the government’ (Todaro and Smith 2011: 756).  
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etc., they can no doubt provide a push towards creating a non-oil economy, non-oil exports 
and non-oil revenue sources. 
 Hertog (2011: 17) sums up the general (neo-liberal) critique of SOEs, namely that 
‘outside of the infrastructure and utility sectors they are generally seen as a bad, outmoded, 
and fiscally deleterious idea – especially [when operating] in rentier states’.11 However, he 
goes on to argue that a new breed of dynamic, profitable and rapidly growing SOEs is found 
in the GCC states. They are successful in both manufacturing and service sectors, and ‘stand 
in striking contrast to the politicized and inefficient SOEs in more populous and more populist 
oil states such as Venezuela, Iran, or Russia’ (Hertog 2011: 17).12 The implication of this 
finding is that – given the right context – firms owned by the government can be efficient, and 
as such, that private sector involvement does not have to be a prerequisite for diversification. 
 Nevertheless, in the current neo-liberal paradigm, especially before the financial crisis 
of 2008, there was, as mentioned above, a strong disbelief in the efficiency of SOEs and a 
correspondingly strong belief in the efficiency gains to be obtained by privatization. 
Furthermore, most studies and development plans, in dealing with diversification in the Gulf 
region, adopt the view that diversification presupposes an increased private sector contribution 
to the economy. 
 The reason for the link between diversification and private sector involvement in the 
economy is twofold. First, under the current allocation state model, only a relatively small part 
of the local population is involved in economic activities. This is so both because oil and gas 
extraction is capital intensive and thus does not provide many jobs, and because, as argued 
above, allocation states do not need to focus on creating a productive base, and therefore cause 
systemic underdevelopment of the productive sectors. So the emphasis on private sector 
development is seen as a way to create jobs and involve a large section of the population in 
production.
13
 
 A second reason for the call for increased private sector involvement as a part of 
diversification relates to the issue of foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI brings with it not 
only capital but also, and more importantly, jobs, new technology and new management 
methods, all items which these economies are in dire need of in their attempt to build and 
expand their societies into knowledge societies. However, FDI flows are private flows which 
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 For a similar understanding and a discussion of advantages gained by privatizing SOEs see Todaro and Smith 
(2011: 758ff.). 
12
 See also Hvidt (2009: 409–10) for a description of SOEs in Dubai. 
13
 See Cook and Nielson (2011: 199) for a similar argument. 
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primarily flow to private firms.
14
 As such the potential for GCC states to attract FDI (except 
for the hydrocarbon sector) is severely limited without a well-functioning private sector. 
2.5. Diversification and the sovereign wealth funds 
Do the sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) play a role in the diversification strategy? El-Kharouf 
et al. (2010: 124) analyse this question and argue that ‘the conception and evolution of the 
SWFs was an integral part of an overall prescription for the cyclical economic and fiscal 
imbalances of the oil-based GCC economies’. The policy premise is simple: by investing oil 
revenues in either local or international industries, the GCC countries could convert the 
volatile and exhaustible oil incomes into a more stable financial stream of wealth that could be 
used to develop their societies in the long run (El-Kharouf et al. 2010: 133). 
 Kuwait spearheaded this development by establishing the Kuwait Investment Office in 
London as early as 1953 (Beblawi 2011: 189–90). Kuwait’ s Reserve Fund for Future 
Generations, in which 10 per cent of its yearly oil and gas revenues are placed, was estimated 
to hold US$100 billion by the time of the first Gulf War in 1990–1, and the returns on these 
investments were of an order comparable to the annual income from oil and gas (Europa 
Publications 2008: 689). Today, the largest single SWF in the world is the Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority, which alone held assets worth US$ 627 billion in 2011. More than one 
SWF is present in each country. 
 As can be seen from Table 1, the Gulf countries hold an estimated US$1,659 billion of 
assets. If investments are undertaken overseas, they do not create jobs in the local economies 
or contribute to further education and training of the local workforce. 
2.6. How to measure diversification? 
How does one measure change or progress in economic diversification? There is quite a 
battery of measurements, which can provide a detailed picture of effects that stem from the 
diversification process. However, most good measurements need good data and, as such, are  
Table 1. GCC countries deposits in sovereign wealth funds (US$billion), end of 2011 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi  UAE Total 
9 296 8 85 478 783 1,659 
Source: SWF Institute (2012). 
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 Privatization of public sector companies and enterprises is another way to expand the role of the private sector 
as well as open up the economies to foreign investments (ESCWA 2001: 47). 
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hard to apply in the Gulf countries. Thus, only the following few crude measures are usually 
applied: 
1. the percentage contribution of oil versus non-oil sectors to GDP (or GDI), which 
provides an indication of the structural change in society; 
2. the percentage contribution of oil revenues as a proportion of total government 
revenues, which indicates whether or not dependence on oil revenues is being 
reduced; 
3. the percentage contribution of non-oil export to total export earnings, since rising 
non-oil exports are an indication of diversification; 
4. the relative contribution of the public and private sector to GDP, which is an 
important measurement of the success of diversification in so far as development 
of the private sector implies or presupposes growth in the public sector; 
5. the volatility or instability of GDP and its relation to oil price instability. 
 Even though these measures are very crude, they are still difficult to assess in a 
situation of changing oil prices. If the price of oil changes, all these measures will be affected 
(Looney 1994: 10). In addition to the problems associated with having the right kind of data, 
and with the changing oil incomes, in measuring the degree of diversification it has to be 
recognized that a significant share of the non-oil economy is indirectly driven by oil-induced 
demand. Government spending, for example on construction activities, is funded by oil 
money, and as such creates demand for goods and services. 
 The above paragraphs have been an attempt to define and substantiate the concept of 
economic diversification. Diversification entails a broad societal process, which transforms a 
country from a single source of income, in this case oil or gas, to a society where multiple 
sources of income are generated across the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, and where 
large sections of the population participate. It has furthermore been found that private sector 
involvement is generally seen as a necessity for attaining diversification. A practical definition 
applied in a study of the Gulf countries is illustrative:  
Within the context of the GCC countries, economic diversification means reducing heavy 
dependence of the oil sector by developing a non-oil economy, non-oil exports and non-oil 
revenue sources. By implication, it also means reducing the leading role of the public sector 
in the GCC economies by promoting the growth of the private sector. (ESCWA 2001: vii) 
 
11 
3. ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION IN THE GULF REGION: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 
This section reviews the actual process of diversification as it has unfolded in the GCC 
countries over the last half a century and especially following the boom in oil incomes 
subsequent to the oil price hike in 1973/4. Answers to the following question are sought: what 
were the objectives and the overall achievements of the economic diversification effort in the 
GCC countries? In addition to using the various textual sources,
15
 the author has conducted 
field studies in all six Gulf countries and conducted close to a hundred interviews with 
planners, decision makers and analysts over the past years. 
 As pointed out in the ESCWA study, economic diversification has been both the 
byword and the catchphrase of economic policy in the Gulf countries since the first oil boom 
in the 1970s (ESCWA 2001: 1). However, the motivation behind economic diversification has 
changed over time. The drive for diversification in the 1970s was an awareness of the finite 
nature of oil resources, and thus the likely prospect of an end to the oil boom (ESCWA 2001: 
3; Koren and Tenreyro 2010: 2). From this perspective, diversification was to ensure the 
creation of a viable economy that would sustain the livelihood of society in the aftermath of 
the oil era. 
 The sharp decline in oil prices in the first part of the 1980s, and their heightened 
volatility in the 1980s and 1990s, however, shifted the focus for diversification: it was a 
measure to counteract fluctuations in state incomes. Since oil exports had begun, oil (and later 
gas) revenues had become the only noteworthy source of revenue for the Gulf countries, and 
thus the only income to finance the vast governmental spending programmes. As such, the 
price of oil and the nominal GDP of the GCC countries moved in tandem (El-Kharouf et al. 
2010: 131). It was this one-to-one relationship between international oil prices and the 
performance of the economies (export earnings, current accounts, government revenues, and 
ultimately total income and employment) that made diversification one of the priorities in 
economic policy (ESCWA 2001: vii, 3),
16
 or as bluntly pointed out by Peterson (2009: 1): 
‘The decline in oil prices during the 1980s, though, hammered home a key lesson, namely, 
that prosperity and continued growth could not remain unhealthily dependent on oil income, 
reinforced by the fact that oil was a depletable resource – and was being depleted rapidly in 
some states.’ 
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 The most important sources that inform this chapter are ESCWA (2001), Looney (1994), Shochat (2008) and, 
not least, the contributions in Seznec and Kirk (2011). 
16
 Looney (1994: 23–4), for instance, finds a one-to-one relationship between oil incomes and the size of the 
construction sector in each GCC country and a very close relationship between oil incomes and the size of the 
service sector. 
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 The ESCWA study (2001: 8) summarizes the palette of actual measures fully or 
partially applied by the GCC countries in order to achieve economic diversification (and 
development in general): 
1. the development of the physical and social infrastructure: investments in 
infrastructure, schooling and, not least, health services, as such investments were 
deemed necessary for non-oil economy growth; 
2. the development of capital-intensive industries that utilize the region’s comparative 
advantage in hydrocarbon resources: for example, production of steel, aluminium, 
fertilizer and petrochemicals (i.e. chemical components derived from oil which 
serve as building blocks for products such as detergents, adhesives, plastics, fibres, 
lubricants and gels);
17
 
3. the development of other manufacturing industries: for example, cement, 
construction materials (plaster, cladding, rebar, window frames etc.), electrical 
products, textiles, clothing, furniture and household items;
18
 
4. the development of other productive sectors and services: for example, agriculture 
(animal production, poultry, dairy products), trade, banking, financial services and, 
since the early 2000s, aviation, real estate, tourism and a significant buy-up of 
overseas firms (e.g. hotel chains, harbours, real estate) to be managed from the 
Gulf; 
5. the reduction of the direct role of the public sector as an agent of economic 
growth: by privatizing publicly owned companies and utilities and reducing 
domestic subsidies. 
 As pointed out by Cook and Nielson (2011: 199), a ‘one size fit all’ description does 
not apply when it comes to diversification. Each country has its own unique history of 
diversification, and as such represents a unique mix of the above-mentioned measures and a 
unique overall pattern. Interviews and observations by the author in the six GCC countries 
certainly confirm this finding. Oman, for example, is building a service and tourism industry, 
while other Gulf countries promote the banking, media, aviation, shipping or manufacturing 
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 In parallel, the GCC countries invested overseas in productive assets. During the earlier phases, in the 1970s, 
investments were generally placed outside the country, in banks and not least in productive investments (stocks 
and bonds). In the boom years, from 1999 to 2008, a significantly higher percentages of the oil surpluses were 
invested inside the GCC countries (Hvidt 2011b: 40). 
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sectors that best suit their respective geographical locations, natural endowments and resource 
base. 
3.1. What are the overall achievements in the drive towards diversification? 
In Table 2, some numbers are listed which illuminate the achievements – or lack thereof – 
concerning the diversification effort. From the table it is obvious, even after nearly forty years 
of diversification policies, that hydrocarbon export still plays a significant role in the Gulf 
economies. 
 In assessing the period 1973–93, Looney (1994: 25) considers the manufacturing 
sector performance for the GCC countries to be very weak when compared to other non-oil 
Arab countries and in relation to the service and distribution sector. He concludes that the 
GCC attempts at industrialization ‘must be considered minor failures’. Shochat (2008: 13) 
finds that the GCC diversification pursued most proactively in the 1980s and the 1990s was 
within the energy sector, both upstream (searching for and recovering hydrocarbons) and 
downstream (refining, selling and distributing hydrocarbons). 
 ESCWA (2001: 46) finds that since the 1970s, the GCC countries have developed 
industries, services and other sectors, thus reducing the relative size of the oil sector. 
Furthermore, non-oil export has on average increased as a proportion of total exports, while 
the contribution of oil revenue to total government revenues has generally been in decline. The 
study concludes that ‘All these development are indicative of varying degrees of success in 
diversification away from dependence on oil. Nonetheless, nearly three decades after the oil 
boom of the early 1970s, the contribution of the oil sector to the GCC economies in all its 
aspects remains quite high.’ 
Table 2. Oil as percentage of economic indicators in the Gulf countries
a
 
Country % of export earnings % of state budget % of GDP 
Bahrain 69 86 24 
Kuwait 90 93 45 
Oman 65 77 41 
Qatar 91   80
b
 46 
Saudi Arabia 85 85 50 
United Arab Emirates 69 77 32 
Source: Calculated from data in the statistical appendix following each country section in Europa Publications 
(2011).  
a
 Except for Qatar, it is not clear whether these values include proceeds from investments by SWFs.  
b
 Includes proceeds from invested hydrocarbon revenues. 
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 Writing ten years later, Beblawi (2011: 187) stresses the continued dependence on oil, 
and notes that it is ‘clear that neither oil-based nor import substitution industries have much 
hope to survive or to expand in a post-oil era’. This indicates that the diversification efforts 
have not yet resulted in a sustainable development pattern. 
 Seznec (2011a: 30) put the above-mentioned and somewhat meagre results of the 
diversification effort into perspective by reminding us that, despite these shortcomings in the 
diversification drive, ‘From an industrial base of near zero 30 years ago, the Gulf has become 
a major world production center for petrochemicals, fertilizers, aluminium, cement, prefab 
metal building, fiber-optic cables, air conditioners, and all manner of products related to 
construction.’ In addition, he notes that vast current developments in services including 
banking, shipping, logistics and distribution, airports, real estate etc. have taken place. 
 Finally, Koren and Tenreyro, who address the issue of volatility in relation to 
diversification, find:  
in part due to their strong dependence on oil, GCC economies are intrinsically more volatile 
than other economies at the same level of development. Startling progress has been achieved, 
however, since the 1970s, volatility falling in most GCC countries by a factor of 4 or more by 
2005.The fall in volatility is mostly due to two factors. The first is the rise of the service 
economy (comprising, among others, financial intermediation, tourism and real estate), which 
is inherently less volatile than the oil sector and had led to higher levels of sectoral 
diversification. The second is the general decline in volatility in the world markets since the 
1980s, a period that economist have called the ‘great moderation’. (2010: 29) 
3.2. What are the reasons for weak diversification results? 
As Looney (1994: 266) pointed out some twenty years ago, many of the problems 
facing the industrial sectors in the Gulf States can be traced back to the lack of an overall 
industrialization strategy, problems related to the Dutch disease,
19
 the bureaucracy and 
administrative routine, to the instability of the industrial labour force (almost exclusively 
expatriate), to the unbalanced consumer consciousness, to the inadequacies of incentives at 
both production and export levels and to the insufficient protection vis-à-vis competition from 
abroad. 
The above review points out that these problems still undermine the diversification effort. 
 Concerning the lack of an overall industrialization strategy, Looney refers to the 
disappointing results of the GCC’s efforts to coordinate industrial policies. Except for Saudi 
Arabia, each of the Gulf countries remains very small viewed as an individual market. This led 
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sector (Thirlwall 2006: 74). 
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the GCC to aim not only to coordinate but also to allocate industrial activities among the 
member states in its first economic policy period from 1981, because this, it was thought, 
would ‘lead to industrial development and the diversification of their products on an integrated 
basis’ (GCC 1981: Article 12, No. 1). Twenty years later, in 2001, the GCC heads of states 
signed a new economic agreement which went much further in its attempt to integrate the 
economies of the GCC member states by 2010. The integration was to include a customs 
union, a common market and an economic and monetary union with a unified currency (GCC 
2001: Chs. I–III). 
 The customs union was enacted in 2005, creating a single external tariff. The common 
market was declared in 2008 and removed some important barriers to free movement of goods 
and services as well as to the mobility of national labour and capital (Beblawi 2011: 19). The 
establishment of the monetary union has not materialized, and deficiencies in cross-border 
transportation, data sharing and communication technology etc. still affect interregional trade 
significantly. 
 Seznec (2011b: 2–3) offers an explanation for the insufficient protection vis-à-vis 
competition from abroad. He finds that in trading economies, such as the ones found in the 
Gulf states in the 1970s, an import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy does not work – 
economically or politically. An ISI strategy aims to secure a home market for ‘infant’, not yet 
competitive industries by applying steep tariffs or quotas on imports (Todaro and Smith 2011: 
600). However, this option was not open to the Gulf states, because of the detrimental effect 
this would have for their political allies – the merchants – who would have lost their basic 
source of income. Protection of domestic infant industries was therefore difficult to attain. 
 This lack of protection thus forced newly established industries to attain international 
competitiveness right from the outset, which made it preferable to opt for turnkey solutions 
and, not least, to employ skilled expatriate labour both in the new industries and in the 
services to go with them. In this way, the economic interests of the merchants and the 
application of foreign labour became a part of the framework condition for development in the 
Gulf region (Seznec 2011b: 3).
20
 
 An additional effect of the inability to protect the newly formed industries and services 
through tariffs was that governments felt obliged to pay ‘heavy government subsidies’ 
directed at, for example, manufacturing, agriculture, basic metal industries and the services 
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sector (Shochat 2008: 9). Subsidizing can thus be seen as a different way of protecting infant 
industries, in that it lowers their production cost. 
 Shochat (2008: 11–12) furthermore argues that the diversification ‘remained largely 
ineffective’ until the late 1990s, because it was not accompanied by structural change; that is, 
by changes related to the reduction of the public sector as the agent of economic growth, the 
lack of private and foreign investment, the deficiency of qualified manpower and the small 
market size. However, since then and especially during the boom period of 2002–8, economic 
reforms have targeted these areas and allowed diversification to be pursued with much greater 
vigour and success. 
 Hvidt (2011a: 102) analyses the economic and institutional reforms actually 
undertaken in the GCC countries during the decade prior to 2008 and finds that, with the 
exception of Qatar and Kuwait, these countries have in fact been implementing substantive 
reforms. Nevertheless, he warns that, ‘while this is certainly an important initial step for these 
countries in reaching their stated aims of diversifying their economies and revitalizing the role 
of the private sector, rolling back 30 to 50 years of rentierism is not a process that can be 
accomplished easily or hastily’. 
3.3. Summary 
In summary, over the last five decades, the GCC states have taken a number of important steps 
on the route to diversifying their economies away from dependence on oil and gas. 
Infrastructure has been built, education and health systems have been created, and a broad 
range of manufacturing industries primarily servicing an international market have been 
established. Since the early 2000s, important economic reforms have been undertaken in some 
of the countries (though not Qatar and Kuwait), which have attempted to make investment by 
both nationals and foreigners attractive. Data shows, however, that the countries remain in a 
position where the oil sector continues to dominate the economy, and that few of the industries 
and services established would survive in a post-oil era. So the GCC states continue to be in 
the situation where they sell their hydrocarbons on the world market and use the proceeds to 
import almost all of their living requirements and large parts of their labour force. Viewed in 
this manner, the diversification strategy has largely failed. 
4. REVIEW OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
An account of the past record of diversification was given in the previous section. Here, the 
focus shifts towards the future and the paper looks at how decision makers in the GCC 
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countries envision diversification and economic development in the years to come. For this 
purpose, the current published development plans, or Visions as some countries prefer to call 
them, act as the main source of data. 
 It is recognized that development plans do not offer solid evidence of what countries 
intend to do or what they actually will do. Various reasons underpin every planning exercise. 
First, and probably foremost, there is the economic imperative to overcome market failure; 
second, there is the need to facilitate mobilization of resources, both internally in a country 
and externally; and finally, plans may have an ‘attitudinal’ or ‘psychological’ impact 
(Martinussen 1997: 229). As such they can been seen as a part of the government’s 
communication strategy and might, for example, comfort the population by addressing 
problems they are facing, such as housing shortages, health care issues etc.; or they might 
prepare the population for major reforms to come, such as changes in retirement bonuses or 
cuts in public sector jobs; or they might be a signal to international investors or creditors that 
the economy is well managed. 
 In other words, the plans are to be seen, read, interpreted and acted upon, rather than 
viewed as representations of physical events. Such documents must be analysed with these 
uses in mind. Krippendorff (2004: Foreword) suggests applying the methodology of 
qualitative content analysis to such data. This will be done in this paper. 
 Despite their shortcomings, the current plans are practically the only written source 
which offers insights into the aims and aspirations of decision makers in relation to the 
development of economies.
21
 Even though many of the plans have been drafted with input 
from international consultancy firms, and thus may represent some degree of ‘knowledge 
transfer’ related to ideologies and international best practice etc., such plans are ultimately 
official documents, prepared in ministries, discussed among top decision makers and approved 
by the local rulers, who thereby subscribe to the overall ideas and conclusions embodied in the 
plans. 
 The planning approach found in the GCC countries varies in scope, in level of detail 
and in quality. All these countries have published long-term plans or visions establishing 
broader targets which are to be implemented through detailed plans and spending budgets. The 
general planning style is indicative planning, implying that economic incentives – not 
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18 
directives – are issued in order to make the non-public actors pursue the planned targets. 
Typically the detailed plans (the five-year plans) establish quantitative targets, such as those 
related to investments, employment opportunities, GDP, the pattern of consumption and, not 
least, targets related to human and social development.
22
 
4.1. Bahrain 
4.1.1. The plan 
Economic planning is a recent phenomenon in Bahrain. In October 2008, it launched its 
Economic Vision 2030 plan, and a year later its National Economic Strategy, which is a 
detailed and short-term spending plan aimed to achieve the Vision 2030 aims. The first plan is 
publicly accessible, while the latter is not. Vision 2030 was prepared by the Economic 
Development Board (EDB), a recently established unit headed by Crown Prince HH Shaikh 
Salman bin Hamdan Al Khalifa. 
 Vision 2030 outlines a future path for the development of the Bahraini economy, built 
on a much-increased role for the private sector. The vision is ‘to shift from an economy built 
on oil wealth to a productive, globally competitive economy, shaped by the government and 
driven by a pioneering private sector – an economy that raises a broad middle class of 
Bahrainis who enjoy good living standards through increased productivity and high-wage 
jobs’ (Bahrain EDB 2008: 3). More specifically, the ultimate aim of the plan is that every 
Bahraini household double its disposable income – in real terms – by 2030 (Bahrain EDB 
2008: 6). Vision 2030 spells out the main challenge facing Bahrain, namely to create enough 
new jobs, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to secure employment for the fast-growing and 
successively better-educated Bahraini workforce. At present, Bahrainis are not the preferred 
choice for employers in the private sector, as stated in the plan. Job creation in Bahrain is 
currently aimed at low-skilled and thus low-paid non-Bahraini workers. Thus, the aim is to 
create or to attract (through FDI) jobs which contain high-level knowledge competencies and 
so result in high wages, and furthermore to make Bahrainis the preferred choice of labour 
(Bahrain EDB 2008: 8). 
 Until now, weak job creation has been solved by redistributing oil revenues and more 
directly by offering citizens jobs in the public sector. This, as is pointed out, has left the 
country with an oversized public sector, which is viewed as unsustainable considering the 
gradual decline of oil reserves (Bahrain EDB 2008: 7): 
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A considerable share of the country’s growth over the last two decades was driven by the 
public sector. This model is running out of steam, as government finances become tighter and 
competition increases in a global economy. By 2030, the private sector should be able to 
drive economic growth in Bahrain independently. (2008: 10) 
As such, the aim is to increase productivity in the private sector, and not least that the private 
sector becomes motivated to hire Bahraini people. The purpose is therefore to create an 
environment which is conducive to entrepreneurship and innovation, and which will create 
knowledge-based and high-value-adding companies and economic activities. Bahrain’s 
economy will thus attain increasing levels of sophistication and innovation, enabling the 
country to claim an attractive position in the global value chain (Bahrain EDB 2008: 16). 
 The financial sector will remain the lead sector in the economy. Besides this, tourism, 
business services, manufacturing and logistics will be developed as income earning sectors. 
The public sector will invest in improving its human capital through education and training, 
particularly in the field of applied sciences. 
 The plan is less specific on how to attain these aims. However, investment in human 
resources, namely health and especially education, is highlighted. Education is mentioned 
again and again in the plan and is seen as a prerequisite for attaining a knowledge-based 
society. As a stimulus for educational efforts, the plan states ‘Bahraini society in 2030 will be 
a meritocracy where hard work and talent are rewarded with success’ (Bahrain EDB 2008: 
20). A further means to achieve the aims is to attract FDI, which the plan claims is one of the 
key drivers of process innovation and best-practice transfer. 
4.1.2. Review  
Bahrain is a small country with very limited oil reserves, at least compared to its neighbours. 
Around 1.2 million inhabitants currently live there, including 670,000 non-nationals.
23
 The 
lack of oil led the country to pursue a diversification strategy from the early 1970s, 
encompassing industrial developments, refineries, the shipyard, steel, its manufacturing 
flagship the ALBA aluminium smelter, and a range of downstream industries for processing 
raw aluminium. Financial services, however, became the leading sector in the diversification 
drive following the relocation of the international banking community from Lebanon to 
Bahrain in 1975 after the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon (MEED 2009a). In the 1980s 
the country was already the most industrialized country in the GGC, since services and 
industry accounted for roughly 50 per cent of the economy (Koren and Tenreyro 2010: 6; 
                                                          
23
 Unless otherwise stated, the source of factual information concerning population size and composition is the 
statistical survey following each country section in Europa Publications (2011). 
20 
O’Sullivan 2008: 198). Bahrain is furthermore the only GCC country which, as a part of its 
diversification plan from 2006, has implemented a free trade agreement (FTA) with America. 
 As seen above, Vision 2030 represents a full frontal attack on the allocation state 
approach. It expects the private sector to take a leading role in society. Furthermore, job 
creation is no longer to take place in the public sector, but in the private.
24
 The plan sends a 
strong signal to the Bahraini people that a meritocracy will be implemented and as nationals 
they must prepare themselves to compete not only among themselves, but also against 
foreigners for jobs. As such the plan has a neo-classical flavour to it. 
 The role of the state is reduced to providing social and health services, environmental 
issues, housing, education, foreign policy, defence etc. The word ‘privatization’, however, is 
not mentioned. 
 As pointed out by MEED (2009b), Vision 2030 is ‘perhaps the boldest of the strategic 
documents published by any of the Gulf governments, addressing not just development and 
planning issues, but also mapping out a future direction for economic, governmental and 
social progress over the next 21 years’. It is the plan which most openly points to the current 
shortcomings of the allocation state model. 
4.2. Kuwait 
4.2.1. The plan 
In February 2010, the National Assembly of Kuwait approved a five-year development plan 
covering the years 2010 to 2014.
25
 This was the first plan approved since 1986 (Global 
Investment House 2010). In addition to the five-year plan, a detailed expenditure budget was 
approved for the period, devising how the government was to spend resources, both to develop 
the country further and to pull Kuwait out of the recession which it, along with the rest of the 
world, had experienced since September 2008. The budget included total spending of US$125 
billon (Global Investment House 2010). 
 Prior to the approval of the five-year plan, the General Secretariat of the Supreme 
Council for Planning and Development (formerly the Ministry of Planning) had published its 
long-term plan, the State Vision Kuwait 2035. 
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 The aim of the State Vision Kuwait 2035 plan and the five-year plan is to turn Kuwait 
into a regional trade and financial hub for the northern Gulf through economic development, 
diversification and GDP growth. In order to fulfil these aims, significant investments are to be 
undertaken, among them a new business hub, the so-called Silk City at Subiyah, with 
estimated costs of US$77 billion; construction of a major deep-sea container port at the Shatt 
Al Arab, which aims to attract the traffic otherwise aimed for Basra and Umm Qasr in Iraq; 
new railway and metro systems; the establishment of new cities to host the increasing 
population; and basic infrastructure and services, particularly within the health and education 
sectors.
26
 Besides these expenditures, a significant fraction of public spending will be invested 
in the oil and gas sector, in order to raise production capacity and modernize current facilities 
(Global Investment House 2010; State of Kuwait 2009: 74ff.). Half of the US$125 billion 
expenditure is to be provided by the private sector, through investments in, for example, mega 
projects. 
 The plan furthermore recognizes the need to reform the legislative and institutional 
setup in the country and includes a substantive list of amendments to be made during the 
planning period. Forty-five laws need amendment and more than 230 policies are targeted for 
change or creation in order to facilitate the implementation of the plan within its three main 
areas: not only economic development and human and social development, but also public 
administration, planning and information.
27
 A considerable number of these reforms are to 
make it easier and more attractive for private investors, both domestic and foreign, to invest in 
the country. 
4.2.2. Review 
Kuwait is a small but wealthy country (ranked as the eleventh richest in the world by income 
per capita), with 3.6 million people, of whom approximately 2.4 million are non-nationals. As 
was seen in Table 2 above, petroleum accounts for nearly half of GDP, 90 per cent of export 
revenues and 93 per cent of government income. 
 Kuwait has done little to diversify its economy over the years. This is partly, as some 
interviewees pointed out, because of the positive fiscal situation, which has allowed the 
country to carry on in an unsustainable way, and partly because of the constant dispute 
between the National Assembly and the government, which has paralysed economic decision 
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 Interview, General Secretariat of the Supreme Council for Planning and Development, Kuwait City, 3 April 
2011. See also State of Kuwait (2009: 78). 
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making over decades. According to Crystal (1990: 95ff.), attempts were made in the 1960s, 
1970s and early 1980s to establish mechanisms for planning, but with very little impact 
because political consensus remained absent. This has continued to be the case (Crystal 2007: 
159ff.). In 2007, however, a renewed emphasis on development and economic planning 
surfaced and led to the creation of a new entity: the General Secretariat of the Supreme 
Council for Planning and Development.
28
 The commissioning of various expert reports and 
other planning initiatives are a testimony to this renewed emphasis. 
 In the 1950s Kuwait was the most developed among the GCC countries, and thus had 
the most promising developmental trajectory.
29
 However, development has suffered not only 
from lack of political consensus, but also from fundamental shocks to the economy unique to 
the country. The first was the Iran–Iraq War (1980–8), which decreased the accessibility (by 
both sea and land routes) and thus the attractiveness of Kuwait as a trading hub. The second 
was the impact of the Iraqi invasion and the following Gulf War (1990–1), which left the 
country with badly functioning infrastructure, an enormous debt and, not least, an unresolved 
security situation. This has had negative impacts on the private sector’s willingness to invest 
in the country since then.
30
 
 The current plans, however, seem to be an attempt to put the country back on a 
development track by returning to former successes, within trade and financial activities. This 
is to be done by initiating some long-overdue reforms. The emphasis is on making it more 
attractive for private investors through improved infrastructure, better rules and regulation etc. 
The long-term aim is that the private sector should be the driver of the economy and be able to 
absorb the increasing labour force. The fact that the expenditure plan assumes private 
investments is a testimony to a policy that aims to involve and foster a private sector. 
Furthermore, the proposed regulation that highlights transparency and accountability within 
the public sector could be interpreted as a step in the same direction. However, there are no 
indications in the plans, at least in the medium term, that the government intends to shift away 
from the current state-led developmental model. While encouraging the private sector to take a 
slowly increased part in society, the government retains responsibility for overall 
development. Finally, it is an open question whether or not sufficient consensus can be 
established within Kuwait to implement the proposed plans. 
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4.3. Oman 
4.3.1. The plan 
Oman has a long tradition of economic planning. Since seizing power in 1970, Sultan Qaboos 
and his government have attempted to direct development through a series of five-year plans, 
the first of which was launched in 1976. The latest is the Eighth Five-Year Development Plan 
(2011–2015), which was announced on 2 January 2011. Each five-year plan is nested within a 
long-term development strategy, the first covering the period 1970–95, and the second, 
normally referred to as Vision 2020, covering the period 1996–2020 (MONE 1995). The 
recently established Supreme Council for Planning is entrusted with the task of preparing the 
development plans and annual budgets.
31
 While the Vision 2020 plan is published in full, only 
highlights of the five-year plans are made available to the public, on the website of the 
Ministry of Information. 
 Economic diversification has taken priority in the planning effort since the early 1970s, 
because of the country’s limited oil and gas reserves and thus their unreliability as an income 
generator in the long term.
32
 As a part of the diversification strategy, the first long-term 
strategy opted for government investments in income-generating projects within industry (e.g. 
the highly successful liquefied petroleum gas [LPG] facilities), mining, agriculture and 
fisheries. 
 Vision 2020 pursues the aim of ‘providing suitable conditions for economic take off’, 
which implies diversification by increasing the non-oil production in the country (MONE 
1995: Section 2.6.4). It aims to achieve substantial changes in the structure of the national 
economy by diversifying the production base, enhancing the role of the private sector in the 
economy and developing human resources (MONE 1995: Section 2.7). In short, the plan seeks 
diversification, industrialization, privatization and increased integration into the global 
economy, in order to achieve the long-term aim of a productive and diversified economy. The 
specific aim is to reduce the oil sector’s contribution to GDP to 9 per cent by 2020. According 
to Table 2 above, oil still accounted for 41 per cent of GDP in 2011. Tourism and gas-based 
industries are key components of the government’s diversification strategy.33 
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 The Eighth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) continues the efforts carried out under the 
previous plan, namely to complete and develop infrastructure and to improve the investment 
environment. More than half of total spending in the Eighth Five-Year Plan is allocated to the 
construction of airports and roads and another 26 per cent is allocated to seaports, water and 
housing (United Securities 2011: 11). Concerning improvement in the investment 
environment, a key element in the diversification strategy under the previous plan was the 
liberalization of foreign ownership policies. It was made possible to exercise 100 per cent 
ownership of assets within industry and for foreigners to buy property in Oman under freehold 
arrangements (MEED 2008). The explicit aim of these reform policies was to enhance the 
competitiveness of the national economy in the global arena (Ministry of Information, 
Sultanate of Oman 2006, 2011). 
 In the current plan, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in tourism, industry, 
agriculture and fisheries are encouraged in order to increase the role of the private sector in the 
economy. SMEs are furthermore seen as a vehicle to attract domestic and foreign private 
investments and hence raise the private sector’s share in GDP and the provision of new work 
opportunities, particularly for the national workforce (Oman Daily Observer 2011). 
 Creating enough jobs for the Omani labour forces is a key issue as well. To further this 
end, Oman has employed one of the harshest strategies among the GCC countries in relation 
to bringing its own population into the workforce. The government has reserved entire 
categories of jobs and certain sectors exclusively to Omanis.
34
 Only one third of the Omani 
labour force is expatriate. Tertiary education has furthermore been liberalized, thus providing 
more educational options – especially outside of Muscat. Liberalization of investment law has 
also attracted FDI. This applies particularly to the three sectors of tourism, construction and 
industry (MEED 2008). The Eighth Five-Year Plan expects to generate 40,000 to 55,000 new 
jobs a year. 
 Oman was one of the few countries in the region to announce plans to privatize all 
remaining state-owned power and water. In the Eighth Five-Year Plan, however, there is no 
mention of further privatization, which could be a consequence of the negative impact on 
investments of the financial crisis that hit in 2008. 
4.3.2. Review 
Oman, with its 2.7 million inhabitants (including approximately 820,000 non-nationals), has 
since the early 1970s directed revenues from its limited oil and gas production into the 
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economy, in order to see through diversification.
35
 It has been a state-led policy, carried out 
through a succession of five-year plans. As a result of these policies and aided by a climate 
suitable for agricultural production, however limited, and by good maritime conditions for 
fishing, in 2010 Oman had the second most diversified economy among the GCC countries 
(MEED 2010a). 
 In the absence of substantial oil and gas reserves, Oman seems to have chosen the most 
obvious path available in its diversification effort, namely to (re)invigorate the private sector. 
As such, the government has seen through substantial economic reforms since the early 2000s 
which have improved the business climate, opened up for foreign investments (for instance by 
creating free zones) and invited investors into gas development. 
 Despite these initiatives, as highlighted in Table 2 above, the country is still very much 
dependent on the hydrocarbon sector. Tourism, thanks to the unique landscape of the country, 
holds significant promise, but so far the tourism infrastructure is noticeably underdeveloped – 
at least outside the capital, from the author’s observations. Both for the tourism industry and, 
not least, for the industrial sector, proximity to Dubai is important and likely to provide 
incentives to adopt liberal policies, since this opens up Oman as a hinterland to the economic 
activities of Dubai and Abu Dhabi. The joint venture between the Port of Rotterdam and the 
government of Oman concerning the development of the Port of Sohar and its industrial free 
zone is one example of this hinterland approach.
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 Despite attempts to foster a viable private sector, the Omanis are still subject to a 
highly state-led, developmental model. In the plans, it is still the government and not the 
private sector that is expected to initiate and drive the economy. However, the policy has a 
distinct neo-liberal flavour to it, in that it emphasizes a free market economy and an active 
private sector. This, in combination with rapidly depleting oil resources, makes it a matter of 
urgency for Oman to implement a diversified and production-oriented policy. 
4.4. Qatar 
4.4.1. The plan 
In July 2008, Qatar published the long-term plan called Qatar National Vision 2030, which 
was followed by the publication of the Qatar National Development Strategy 2011–2016 in 
March 2011. Vision 2030 is a short (just 35 pages), very general plan setting out long-term 
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development goals, while the National Development Strategy is a 286-page report which 
encompasses not only detailed plans for specific projects and initiatives, but also economic 
and institutional changes to be undertaken during the plan period. Parallel to these plans, the 
Urban Planning and Development Authority is drawing up a national master plan to guide 
land use, namely for infrastructure, mega projects, housing and industrial activities. 
Furthermore, a transport plan is under way (GSDP 2011: 88). This sudden and substantial 
emphasis on planning is to be viewed within the context of the upcoming FIFA World Cup, 
which is to be hosted by Qatar in 2022. 
 The overall aim of Vision 2030 is to transform ‘Qatar into an advanced country by 
2030, capable of sustaining its own development and providing a high standard of living for 
all of its people for generations to come’ (GSDP 2008: 2). Development within the economic 
realm is to be guided by three overriding policies: sound economic management, responsible 
exploitation of oil and gas, and suitable economic diversification. Unlike other countries in the 
region, notably Bahrain and Oman, Qatar is planning in and for a situation of plentiful 
hydrocarbon reserves. The country holds the largest gas reserves in the world and sufficient 
reserves of oil to keep production going for another 45 years.
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 The plan aims for ‘suitable economic diversification’, by which is understood a 
diversified economy that ‘gradually reduces its dependence on hydrocarbon industries, 
enhances the role of the private sector and maintains its competitiveness’ (GSDP 2008: 2). 
 The National Development Strategy implements the visions outlined in Vision 2030. It 
spells out that diversification necessitates bolstering entrepreneurship and private sector 
development, improving the business climate, strengthening regional integration and 
reforming the labour market (GSDP 2011: 26). As it points out, in Qatar, ‘Diversifying the 
domestic output base is not a stroke-of-the-pen shift. Entrepreneurship and innovation need to 
be learned, embedded in the education system and in the surrounding culture and supported 
through business friendly policies and regulations’ (GSDP 2011: 93). 
 The strategy points out that there is no ready formula for how to attain diversification, 
and mentions that Qatar has achieved little by way of diversification of output since the early 
2000s. It highlights the significant challenges Qatar faces in the creation of a diversified 
economy, namely lack of entrepreneurship, the limited size of the economy and thus the 
limited number of consumers. It is also in a disadvantaged geographical location, where land 
transport can only be by way of Saudi Arabia. In addition, like the other GCC countries it has 
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an economic model with low wages in the private sector and high wages in the public sector, 
which effectively discourages nationals from seeking employment in the private sector. 
Finally, there are Dutch disease issues (GSDP 2011: 95). The plan refers to a study pointing 
out that Qatar exported 1,630 products in 2008, but 98 per cent of them (in value terms) were 
linked directly to the hydrocarbon sector (GSDP 2011: 94). 
 The plan points to the weakness of the private sector; for example, ‘Qatar’s private 
sector will need strengthening, with support and incentives that encourage acquiring relevant 
capabilities and participating in a wide range of economic activities’ (GSDP 2011: 93). The 
government thus feels obliged to undertake the twin functions of spearheading development 
and assuring the growth of private sector capabilities through financial support and other 
means (GSDP 2011: 96). 
 A considerable emphasis is placed on reforming the economy and its institutions 
towards openness, streamlining rules and strengthening the legal framework for enterprises. 
So far, the law concerning FDI has been liberalized, allowing full foreign ownership of assets; 
industrial cities at Dukhan, Mesaieed and Ras Laffan have been established; and economic 
free zones are under way (GSDP 2011: 97). 
 While oil and gas will continue to provide the main income in the foreseeable future, 
Qatar has an explicit focus on creating a knowledge economy as a means to create a regional 
hub for knowledge and high-value industrial and service activities (GSDP 2008: 24). Qatar 
has therefore invested large sums in establishing a cluster of well-known international 
universities, primarily American – the so-called Education City (MEED 2009c; Willoughby 
2008). Qatar spends 5 per cent of its GDP on education (GSDP 2011: 4). The knowledge 
economy is envisioned to bring more Qataris into the labour force and thus, in the long run, to 
reduce the number of expatriates in the country. These currently make up 80 per cent of the 
workforce (MEED 2009e). 
4.4.2. Review  
Qatar, with its approximately 1.7 million inhabitants (of whom 1.2 million are non-nationals), 
is aiming for a future with oil and gas.
38
 It is deliberately planning for a controlled approach to 
development and a slow process of diversification. Both plans implicitly send the signal that a 
Dubai-type fast-track development is not the way Qatar wants to proceed. 
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 In 2009 only 6 per cent of the labour force was Qatari, implying that only 75,000 
among the national population of approximately 377,000 held a formal job.
39
 Only 0.3 per 
cent of these work in the private sector (GSDP 2011: 148ff.). So to create a diversified 
economy based on a Qatari workforce and a Qatari private sector is a major if not impossible 
challenge. As such, the policies outlined to create a ‘capable and motivated workforce’ and, 
not least, a ‘capable private sector’ are urgent. 
 The plan is neo-liberal in its orientation and sees Qatar competing in a globalized 
scene, thus placing a distinct emphasis on the market. However, the plan sees the state and not 
the private sector as the main driver of the economy for decades to come. The private sector, it 
is claimed, is not yet ready to play a prominent role in the economy. The plan therefore aims 
to establish the preconditions for increased private sector involvement in the future. In order 
for the state to fulfil its role in development, it ‘requires continuous improvements in the 
efficiency, transparency and accountability of government agencies’ (GSDP 2008: Foreword). 
 As mentioned, the sudden and very extensive planning effort undertaken in Qatar 
must, however, be viewed within the context of the upcoming FIFA World Cup 2022. The 
country aims to spend US$70 billion over the intervening years on infrastructure, stadiums, 
housing etc., to facilitate this single event but certainly also as a part of the general 
development of the emirate (MEED 2012a: 23). One example is the 40 km Qatar–Bahrain 
causeway, which has been in preparation for more than a decade, but became an integrated 
part of the World Cup infrastructure, making it possible for some of the fans to be housed and 
entertained in Bahrain. As such the current effort can be seen as an attempt to plan the 
developments economically, socially, environmentally and according to land use before the 
excavators begin work. The National Development Strategy devotes a full chapter to the issue 
of ‘developing modern public sector institutions’, where capabilities such as ‘strategic policy 
and planning’ and ‘budget and financial management’ etc. must be acquired and implemented 
before the event. 
4.5. Saudi Arabia 
4.5.1. The plan 
Saudi Arabia has the longest and most elaborate tradition of planning among the GCC 
countries, institutionalized in the Ministry of Economy and Planning (MoEP).
40
 Since 1970, 
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nine development plans have guided the economy. The latest, the Ninth Development Plan, 
covers the years 2010–14. In 2004 a Long-Term Strategy, which spans the time period of 
2005–24, was published. The subsequent plans, namely the eighth and the ninth, have been 
aligned with this strategy. Besides these plans, there are eight sector plans, the so-called 
National Plans. They cover areas such as youth, transport, privatization, employment, science 
and technology, industry etc. (MoEP 2010b). 
 The Long-Term Strategy was established in response to a number of challenges, 
notably the ‘emerging challenges of providing productive employment to Saudi national 
manpower and improving the quality of life’ (MoEP 2004: Section 3.1). Among the aims of 
the Strategy is to raise the national economy to the level of advanced economies, which 
implies doubling the per capita income between 2004 and 2024, creating jobs for the fast-
growing and thus young population, increasing the role of non-oil production in the economy, 
and reducing the share of oil and gas in total exports from 72 per cent to 37 per cent during the 
plan period. As such, diversification and expansion of the economy base of society are the 
central focus of the plan and have, it claims, been the ‘key objective of economic and social 
development ever since the development planning system was initiated some thirty years 
[earlier]’ (MoEP 2004: Section 3.2.2.A). 
 The Ninth Development Plan targets the problems of living standards, lack of 
employment opportunities, regionally uneven growth and lack of international competiveness 
for the Saudi economy. The primary means to tackle those problems, besides the issue of 
uneven growth within the regions of Saudi Arabia, is increased participation by the private 
sector in the economy. The private sector is expected to increase production, open the country 
for investments (including FDI) and exports, and, not least, create jobs for the citizens (MoEP 
2010a: 31ff., 2010c: 712ff.). 
4.5.2. Review 
Saudi Arabia is massively larger than the other GCC countries in terms of land mass, 
population and energy reserves. It has a population of 27 million, of whom 8.4 million are 
non-nationals; it sits on top of 19 per cent of the world’s proven oil; and it has succeeded in 
establishing industrial muscle within petrochemicals, processing crude output into 
downstream products of oil through some forty years of diversification strategies (Seznec 
2011a: 30ff.). Given not only the country’s size but the time elapsed since the start of its oil 
era (beginning straight after World War II) and the level of institutional development, change 
of policies and implementation of plans are glacial in speed when compared to those of the 
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small ‘city-states’ like Qatar. Despite an oil production of close to 10 million barrels of oil a 
day in 2011, the country has the lowest GDP per capita among the GCC countries, due to its 
large population and relatively underdeveloped economy.
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 Significant problems have become apparent over the last decades, namely the issue of 
youth (un)employment, low living standards and a considerable rise in poverty among 
Saudis.
42
 Despite commanding nearly one fifth of the oil reserves in the world, Saudi Arabia 
faced current account deficits and tight budgets during the two decades starting in the early 
1980s. During this period GDP declined to approximately half and the financial constraints 
translated into drastically falling living standards and a rise in unemployment (MEED 2005). 
 The problem is recognized in the Ninth Development Plan, which explicitly aims to 
raise the real income of citizens, to improve the quantity and quality of services offered to 
them, and to contain poverty (MoEP 2010a: 8). As such, there is an understanding that the 
‘old’ oil-based economy is inadequate to run the current society. 
 The development plans focus on increasing the role of the private sector in the 
economy. However, the word ‘privatization’ is not mentioned anywhere in the plans, implying 
that increased private sector involvement relates to newly established activities – likely to be 
within the SME sector. Neither the established industries based on the oil sector, such as the 
petrochemical industries, nor the various state-owned enterprises are to be privatized, in this 
perspective. 
 There is no specific mention of the future role of ‘the state’. So far development has 
been state led, in the sense that a significant part of economic activity has relied upon public 
sector spending (not only on investments in e.g. infrastructure and schools, but also on the vast 
public sector recurrent spending), which is tightly linked to the income from oil and gas. So, 
even though the private sector contribution to GDP is almost 60 per cent, this does not 
indicate that the economy is market driven. 
 There is a distinctly neo-liberal flavour to the plans, due to the significant focus on the 
merits of the private sector and a market-driven economy. This orientation is in accordance 
with the actual implementation of liberal reforms since the early 2000s, aimed at improving 
the business climate in Saudi Arabia and, as a part of this, the climate for domestic and 
especially foreign investments. Attracting FDI has a very high priority, both in the private and 
in the public sector, for example in utilities or gas and oil extraction. In this way FDI is 
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believed to assist the country in building a new production base. Investments in the utilities 
sector are especially welcome. The liberalization process of opening up the economy to 
foreign competition has a flip side: many Saudi-owned firms were not competitive enough and 
thus have been forced to close down.
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 A key achievement in the liberalization process has been the attainment of membership 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2005. The Saudi Arabian General 
Investment Authority (SAGIA), with powers vested directly by King Abdullah, has made a 
special effort in branding the country as ‘business friendly’ to attract FDI, and has 
consequently succeeded in improving the procedures needed to start, operate and close a 
business. As a result, the 2012 World Bank Doing Business index rated Saudi Arabia as the 
twelfth easiest place in the world to do business.
44
 Even though there is evidence to question 
the soundness of this ranking, there is no doubt that Saudi Arabia has carried through a 
significant number of reforms to ease the business climate since the early 2000s.
45
 
4.6. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
4.6.1. The plan 
In February 2010, the UAE launched its Vision 2021.
46
 This plan was preceded by the 
National Work Program from 2005 and the UAE Government Strategy (2008–2010). 
Following the launch of Vision 2021, the government published the UAE Government 
Strategy (2011–2013). The latter three documents carry the signature of the ruler of Dubai, 
Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, who acts as vice-president and prime minister 
for the UAE. All these plans appear to be inspired by the proactive and pro-business rhetoric 
which had become synonymous with Dubai until the financial crisis hit in 2008. 
 Vision 2021 is a short (26 pages) and very general plan, stating a series of overall aims 
for the development of the UAE (UAE Cabinet 2010b). The plan explicitly seeks to fulfil an 
aim of securing the dissemination of social and economic development and government 
services to all seven emirates (UAE Cabinet 2010a: Foreword). 
 According to Vision 2021 the UAE aims to become one of the best places in the world 
to do business (UAE Cabinet 2010b: 18). In addition, it aims at diversification:  
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We want the UAE to sustain its drive toward economic diversification, as this is the nation’s 
surest path to sustainable development in a future that is less reliant on oil. This means 
expanding new strategic sectors to channel our energies into industries and services where we 
can build a long-term competitive advantage. (2010b: 17) 
As mentioned, the means to diversify is to foster new high-growth sectors or industries (such 
as financial services, aviation etc.) which are internationally competitive. Furthermore, the 
traditional sectors of trade and commerce are singled out as ones to be boosted (UAE Cabinet 
2010b: 17). However, the plan favours the creation of a flexible production system so that the 
economy can take advantage of the ever-changing possibilities offered by the global market. 
 The UAE is to transform its economy into a model in which growth is driven by 
knowledge and innovation, or as stated in the Government Strategy (2011–2013):  
the UAE government will continue to encourage innovation, research and development, and 
to strengthen the regulatory framework of key sectors while encouraging emerging high-value 
added sectors in order to enhance the UAE’s competitiveness, develop its business 
environment, and ensure consumer protection. It will also encourage the formation of small 
and medium enterprises. (UAE Cabinet 2010a: 12) 
4.6.2. Review 
The UAE is made up of seven emirates, of which Abu Dhabi and Dubai are much the richest. 
While Dubai has depleted its small oil resources, Abu Dhabi alone commands nearly 7 per 
cent of the world’s proven oil resources. As such Abu Dhabi is by far the wealthiest emirate, 
and sponsors development in the other emirates through its contributions to the budget of the 
Federation and through large off-budget payments to the other rulers. While Abu Dhabi, 
backed by its huge oil reserves, has sought diversification over the years through 
manufacturing industries – metals, plastics, fertilizers, petrochemicals etc. – a ‘new economy’ 
of high-technology-heavy industries, renewable energies, a luxury real estate market and 
cultural tourism has been pursued only lately (Davidson 2009: 61). 
 Dubai, on the other hand, has been the most proactive and eager emirate in its attempt 
at diversification in the GCC region. Through a historical commitment to a business-friendly 
environment, with openness towards foreigners in business and in society in general, as well 
as a strong belief in the proactive role of the ‘state’ in the economy, the emirate introduced a 
range of ‘firsts’ and ‘news’ to the region, in a blend of income-generating activities, 
architecture and logistics during the late 1990s and up to 2008, when it was hit hard by the 
global financial crisis (Hvidt 2007: 559). The key elements of the ‘Dubai model’ of economic 
development are the following: (1) government-led development, (2) fast decision making and 
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‘fast-track’ development, (3) a flexible labour force through importing expatriates, (4) 
bypassing industrialization and creating a service economy, (5) internationalizing service 
provision, (6) creating investment opportunities, (7) supply-generated demand, (8) market 
positioning via branding, and (9) development in cooperation with international partners. The 
development undertaken in Dubai has acted as a model for the other GCC countries – a model 
either to follow or to reject (Hvidt 2009: 401ff.). Dubai claimed that the non-oil sector 
accounted for 95 per cent of GDP in 2005 (Executive Council 2007: 19). Because of the 
speculative elements attached to the building boom, Dubai suffered significantly in the world 
economic crisis that began in 2008. Recent information, however, indicates that the real estate 
market is recovering and that investors and businesses in Dubai are regaining momentum 
(MEED 2012b). 
 Vision 2021 is, as mentioned, very general in nature. It is likely that this reflects the 
political challenges of planning for the seven emirates in unison. These are extremely different 
in geographical size, level of development, population size, oil resources and thus income. The 
plan does not point to any specific problems or challenges facing the state, but appears more 
like a catalogue of ‘positive’ developments to come. 
 Both Vision 2021 and the Government Strategy (2011–2013) allocate a very limited 
role to the private sector. In fact, the word ‘private’ appears only seldom in the document. 
There is no mention of decreased government involvement in the economy, for example 
through privatization of government-owned productive assets, or of increased investments by 
the private sector. At the same time, however, it is made very clear that the UAE operates in a 
global market economy, where productivity, competiveness and innovation are key to success. 
 The plan thus seems to emphasize a special type of economic model, which is market 
driven and at the same time built on public ownership. This model could be called 
‘diversification without privatization’. In this, the public sector – through its investment 
vehicles, such as the Mubadala Development Corporation – creates or buys enterprises and 
operates them on market terms, that is, as if they were private firms. The plans leave no doubt 
that the state is – and should be – entrusted with taking the lead in developing society. The 
private sector seems to be limited to its traditional activities, namely trade and SMEs. 
 Vision 2021 and the Government Strategy (2011–2013) both highlight the necessity for 
an improved regulatory framework within the economic sectors, and a government that is 
accountable, lean, innovative and forward-looking. Planning and coordination, both between 
government entities and between the seven emirates, are viewed as necessary for further 
economic development. 
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5. ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
So what does the review of the development plans tell us? This section will compare the 
content of the current plans or visions published by the six GCC countries. As a guide for the 
comparison, we will use the four questions posed near the beginning of this study, namely: (1) 
What barriers to growth are envisioned in the plans and how should diversification overcome 
them? (2) What economic sectors are targets for the diversification effort? (3) Who will be the 
driver of the future economy? (4) What type of (economic) state is envisioned in the future? 
5.1. What barriers to growth are envisioned in the plans and how should diversification 
overcome them? 
The plans and visions are in near total agreement concerning explicit and implicit barriers to 
growth and how diversification should solve these issues. The first barrier is the future 
depletion of the hydrocarbon reserves. The second is the fluctuating price of oil, and thus the 
fluctuating performance of the GCC economies. Third is the current economic model, the 
allocation state model, where oil money is allocated in the societies and vast amounts of 
income are spent on imported labour. This does not create a sufficient number of jobs, or the 
right kind of jobs, for the fast-growing and increasingly educated national population. Fourth, 
as a combination of the above points, there are the future difficulties of securing high living 
standards for the population (keeping up income levels), since the governments in all the 
states, with the possible exception of Qatar, do not have the financial means to act as the sole 
sponsor of the vast welfare societies established over the last half century. One indicator of 
this is that the oil price which produces the fiscal break-even point of the state budget in each 
country has increased significantly since 2008, to a level where it now equals the actual oil 
price. The Bahraini budget breaks even with oil priced at US$100 per barrel, while Saudi 
Arabia, Oman and the UAE need around US$80 per barrel. Kuwait and Qatar, however, need 
only US$40–50 per barrel (IMF 2011a: 22).47 Hence the GCC economies have become more 
dependent on high oil prices and thus more volatile. A fifth and final barrier to growth 
explicitly or implicitly noted in the plans is the ‘motivational and capability’ (educational) 
problems related to the national workforce. It is understood that ‘nationals’ are neither 
motivated to take jobs outside the protected environment of the public sector, nor capable of 
taking them. As softly stated in the Bahraini plan, nationals are not ‘the preferred choice’ for 
the private sector. 
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 Diversification is seen as a means to solve all of the above problems, or barriers to 
growth. In all the plans, diversification is understood as vertical diversification, where the 
crude output from the hydrocarbon sector is either processed into downstream products like 
petrochemicals or used as input into the manufacturing sector, such as in aluminium smelting 
or steel production. In both cases the value-added benefits the country. Second, vertical 
diversification entails the growth of non-oil-related manufacturing and especially service 
industries. 
 With the UAE as the only exception, the plans reviewed see diversification as 
synonymous with a greater participation by the private sector in the economy. Oman and 
Bahrain signal urgency in accomplishing the diversification process, due to their small and 
rapidly dwindling oil reserves. Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, on the other hand, signal little 
urgency to diversify their economies, with Qatar deliberately aiming for a ‘slow’ 
diversification process. Saudi Arabia falls between these two groups. 
5.2. What economic sectors are targets for the diversification effort? 
All the plans aim at building ‘created comparative advantages’. That is, the current oil and gas 
revenues should be invested in economic assets such as infrastructure, production facilities, 
housing, education, health, and ‘soft infrastructure’ such as administrative and legal practices 
etc., which will enable the country to compete internationally and generate a future income. 
From a review of the plans, a three-step approach to diversification seems to be advocated. 
First, for all countries with sizable hydrocarbon reserves, the first priority is for diversification 
within this sector. This implies using crude oil or gas output to produce downstream products, 
such as petrochemicals, fertilizer and chemicals, or as cheap fuel in energy-intensive 
industries, such as aluminium or steel. Thus the countries reap more of the value-added on 
their endowment. 
 Second, the countries seek further diversification within already successful activities or 
sectors. These include banking or processing raw aluminium in Bahrain; logistics, the seaports 
and trade sector in Dubai; the trade sector in Kuwait; and the LPG industry and steel mills in 
Oman. 
 Third, there is an effort to introduce new sectors, industries or activities which hold 
high growth potential. The choice of such activities has, not surprisingly, been made among 
the well-known high-growth sectors in the globalized economy, such as aviation, tourism and 
hospitality, real estate, logistics and business services or, within manufacturing, high-
technology-content products like smart technologies or green technologies. 
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 The massive investment in airports, planes and flight service facilities by Etihad (Abu 
Dhabi), Emirates (Dubai) and Qatar Airways (Qatar) is an example. According to Airbus 
Industries, passenger transport has generally doubled every 15 years since the 1960s, 
measured as revenue passenger kilometres – a statistic which has been relatively resilient to 
various economic shocks. Forecasters expect this trend to continue, especially due to growth 
in the economies in Asia (Airbus 2012: 20). The proximity of both the European and 
especially the Asian market makes the Gulf a favourable location for such carriers. As one 
observer noted following the Dubai Airshow 2011, the ‘Gulf carriers want to redraw the world 
travel maps and turn the region into a global hub by placing record orders for new planes’ 
(Khaleej Times 2011). Thanks to their ability to maintain high investment levels in new planes 
and, not least, access to jet fuel at very competitive prices, the Gulf carriers expect to gain an 
increasing share of the global market and thus revenues earned in this industry. 
 Given the small size of the indigenous populations, except for that of Saudi Arabia, the 
aim is to diversify into high-value-added jobs. This is mainly because such jobs are well paid 
and thus can support high living standards, but also because they fit well with the type of work 
desired by Gulf citizens.
48
 On the downside, however, such jobs are characterized by a 
significant knowledge content, which again necessitates a high level of education. That is the 
reason why all of the plans emphasize human resources development as a key component of 
the diversification drive. 
5.3. Who will be the driver of the future economy? 
This question is divided into two sub-questions: first, who determines what and how much is 
to be produced (state vs. market), and second, who produces (public vs. private sector). 
 The first question is easily answered from the review of the development plans. The 
nature of these economies is that they sell oil and gas, or related products like petrochemicals, 
fertilizer, aluminium etc., on the world market and basically import all other materials and a 
labour force. Because these economies have virtually no domestic production, they are among 
the most globalized in the world. This is reflected in the plans, in which it is unquestioned that 
the market determines what and how much is to be produced. However, one could argue that 
domestic industries are favoured through subsidies and other price distortions. The productive 
sectors in general benefit from subsidized prices on water, electricity, land etc. Furthermore, 
gas and oil are often provided as feedstock to the petrochemical industry at discounted prices. 
Seznec (2011a: 39), for instance, discusses how the state-owned companies in petrochemicals, 
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such as SABIC or Saudi Aramco, pay significantly lower prices for feedstock than do private 
companies. Another example is that the European and American airlines accuse the fast-
growing aviation sector in the Gulf of benefiting from lower fuel prices and, not least, 
government funding for aircraft purchases etc. (Gulf Times 2011). Furthermore, there is a 
near-complete lack of transparency of the money flows within the large state-owned holding 
companies, which makes it possible to relocate both surpluses and losses within the entities 
(Hvidt 2009: 409). Both examples imply that there are elements of favouritism and the 
protection of domestic industries and, as such, the Gulf economies are not yet fully 
functioning market economies. 
 In terms of the second question, about who should produce – the public or the private 
sector – the countries differ significantly. Bahrain and Oman explicitly aim to create a neo-
liberal free market economy, where the private sector (as opposed to the state) is the driver of 
the economy and where meritocracy is to be (re)introduced into the public sector through real 
competition for jobs. Oman is currently the only country among the six that has specific plans 
to privatize state-owned firms. 
 Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia signal a continuation of the state-led developmental 
model, although with the positive mention of a future role for the private sector. Among these 
countries, the state remains the driver of the economy through its significant development 
budget and ownership of firms, while the private sector operates in a market niche where the 
state has chosen not to invest, for example in trading, retail and construction. Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, however, are in need of further investments in their economies. The only source of 
these investments is the private sector, either local or foreign firms. Saudi Arabia has carried 
through substantial economic reforms to make the country attractive for investments, and 
Kuwait is just at the beginning of this process. The UAE is the only country which does not 
signal an aim to increase the private sector or the role of the free market. 
 Thus, besides Bahrain and Oman, the GCC countries are envisioned as continuing 
along the line of what could be termed ‘state capitalism’. Here the state, through direct 
ownership of productive assets and large governmental budgets, is an active player in the 
market, creating both a supply of goods and services and, not least, a demand for them. 
5.4. What type of (economic) state is envisioned in the future? 
Recall that the allocation state hands out or allocates money and benefits to its population, 
while the production state needs to tax its population. So do the plans reviewed above tell us 
anything about the future along this continuum? 
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 Through their plans and visions, all six countries call for further diversification of the 
productive base (irrespective of whether this is done by the private or the public sector). This 
implies that revenues from oil and gas sales are intended to be invested in real and productive 
assets which can secure future income streams for society – not least to create employment for 
the rapidly increasing national workforce. As such, there is a clearly stated aim of departing 
from the known economic model, where the governments generously disperse oil money and 
services among the citizens and at the same time invite foreign labour to fill the work 
positions in society. 
 Despite the smooth wording, stylish layout and promises of ‘world-class’ health care 
and general livelihood, the plans imply that coming generations of Gulf nationals, both men 
and women, will be expected to educate themselves and compete for jobs – not only in the 
public sector, but also increasingly in the private sector. They must work for most of their 
adult lives and contribute economically to society. The days when a Kuwaiti woman could 
receive a full, lifelong pension having been in the labour market for only 15 years seem to be 
over, according to the plans. 
 Oman, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the most economically challenged countries, express 
most urgency in undertaking these change processes, while neither the UAE nor Qatar signals 
any urgency. None of the plans, however, establishes a timeline for implementing these 
changes. As such one might read the plans as an attempt to articulate or send a warning that 
such policies are necessary – that they will be implemented in the long run. 
5.5. Summary 
The above analysis of the development plans points out that diversification in the broadest 
sense of the word is seen as the means to overcome fundamental problems in the allocation 
state model, by reducing volatility, solving the employment problems and securing high and 
sustainable income levels for citizens in the future. 
 The plans envision a gradual shift from the allocation state model to a more 
production-oriented model, where the state, the citizens and the private sector are encouraged 
to produce – and involved in producing – actual goods and services, and where the 
government relies on proceeds from this production in financing the societies. In order to 
achieve this shift, the diversification process ahead encompasses not only strategic 
investments in economic assets, infrastructure and education, but also – and much more 
politically challenging – broader economic and social reforms aimed at (re-)establishing the 
link between effort and reward in the work life of the nationals, in order to stimulate better use 
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of human resources. In other words, diversification as depicted in the plans calls for much 
more than just fine-tuning the economies: it involves fundamental changes. These will 
necessitate not only significant political commitment from the rulers but also strong and 
autonomous state apparatuses to implement such changes (Evans 1995: 59). As Richard and 
Waterbury remind us, reform processes always have winners and losers (2008: 3). The losers, 
whether individuals, professional groups, tribes or classes, have a natural inclination to oppose 
changes and fight to maintain their privileges, concessions, status or political power. Hence 
reform processes, no matter how beneficial they might be for the larger segments of society, 
will always be faced with oppositional forces. 
6. ASSESSMENT OF THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE PLANNED DIVERSIFICATION IS IMPLEMENTED 
From the review of the past record of the diversification process in section 3 of this paper, we 
found that the process up to now has been slow and has yielded minor results in relation to 
establishing non-oil economic activities. In this section we assess the likelihood that the 
planned diversifications measures will in fact be implemented. 
 As noted earlier, planning and plans serve other purposes than mere implementation. It 
therefore becomes relevant to ask whether the planning documents published in the GCC 
countries should be considered ‘window dressing’ or genuinely meaningful projects that 
function as a tool to direct or guide the actual development in each country. 
 From factors such as the young age of the bureaucracies, the limited power vested in 
the planning ministries or other lead agencies for planning, and, not least, what Hertog (2010: 
5) denotes as the prevailing ‘segmented clientalism’, it is reasonable to assume that both the 
technical capabilities to conduct planning and the ability to implement plans remain quite 
weak throughout the GCC countries. This is especially the case when considering the broader 
and more complex reforms which have to be implemented in order to see through the 
diversification process. Such reforms necessitate not only an efficient and uniform 
implementation within a broad range of ministries and agencies in the state bureaucracy, but 
also country-wide coordination among national, regional and local entities. In other words, 
such reforms necessitate a mature administrative apparatus, which at present is not found in 
the GCC countries. 
 In the subsections below, the likely barriers to implementation of the planned 
diversification drive are discussed under two headings: structural and political. 
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6.1. Structural barriers to the planned diversification 
All the development plans seem to presuppose growth, not only in the domestic economies, 
but also and especially in the global markets they address in their diversification effort. The 
current state of the world economy does not, however, look encouraging in this respect. 
According to a 2011 IMF World Economic Outlook, the financial crisis has turned out to be 
much deeper and last significantly longer than first estimated (IMF 2011b: xv–xviii). The 
October 2012 World Economy Outlook titled Coping with High Debt and Sluggish Growth 
paints an even gloomier picture of the prospects of the recovery of the world economy (IMF 
2012b: xvii). As such, in the years to come the world faces stagnating global demand, slow 
growth, increasing risk and growing fear of protectionism. This medium-term forecast is likely 
to impact on the diversification effort in the GCC countries. A stagnating world economy 
means lower demand for, and thus lower returns on, the manufacturing and services activities 
they have established or aim to establish. This implies that it will be even harder to start and 
sustain new economic activities in both the public and the private sector until the crisis eases. 
 Fortunately for the Gulf states, the global financial crisis coincides with extremely 
high revenues from oil and gas. The incomes from hydrocarbons are now even higher than in 
the boom years of 2002–8 and significantly higher than all of the 1990s, when the oil price 
averaged around US$20 a barrel. In 2008, the previous record year, the average yearly oil 
price reached US$94.45 for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) price 
basket, but after a dip to US$66.06 in 2009 and US$71.45 in 2010, the average oil price for 
2011 stood at US$107.46 and was expected to rise to US$112.12 in 2012 (OPEC 2012). The 
IMF expected this price level to continue in the medium term (IMF 2011b: 34). 
 High state earnings cannot alleviate the demand problems in the world economy. The 
governments can, however, use these assets either to continue the unsustainable policies or to 
leverage economic reforms and other initiatives, furthering the aim of diversification. 
 A second, more technical issue which threatens the planned diversification effort is the 
duplication of activities. Even at present, there is a significant level of economic activity 
duplication among the GCC countries (GSDP 2011: 102). As several interviewees argued and 
as is hinted in the development plans, the GCC countries are in the process of creating further 
overlaps in investments, not only in energy-intensive areas such as petrochemicals, steel and 
aluminium, but also in tourism facilities, aviation, real estate, office space, banking and 
education. The effect of this is, however, difficult to assess. If the GCC countries compete 
against the world as one can claim they do in, for example, the aviation sector, then 
duplication is less of a problem. In fact in the terminology of Porter (1998), one could view 
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the high concentration of airports and carriers in the region as a globally competitive aviation 
‘cluster’. However, if we discuss goods and services of an import substitution character, then 
duplication inevitably leads to smaller home markets for each producing unit and thus less 
efficiency and profitability. 
 A third technical barrier – and closely related to the above – is the lack of interregional 
trade. As mentioned earlier, the GCC’s unification of customs duties in 2005 and the 
declaration of the common market in 2008 removed some important barriers to free movement 
of goods and services, as well as to the mobility of national labour and capital. However, in 
practical terms this has made limited improvements. According to several interviewees, the 
policies and bureaucratic procedures related to the movement of goods, and especially that of 
employers and money, between the countries differs significantly among the six GCC states, 
leading to a situation which discourages interregional trade. 
 Furthermore, there exist deficiencies in the cross-border infrastructure which dampen 
the possibilities of reaping the benefits of a more integrated and enlarged economic space. To 
the degree to which Saudi Arabia can resolve issues related to visa restrictions etc., the 
proposed rail link which is to integrate all of the six countries holds substantial potential in 
this regard. So do smaller projects such as the Qatar–Bahrain causeway (MEED 2011a). 
 The prospect for a more unified and coordinated policy, however, seems bleak, at least 
in the short term. GCC bodies are not granted supranational powers, which implies that any 
policy, big or small, must be approved, adopted and incorporated into the national laws of 
each member state (Legrenzi 2008: 112). Also, owing to historical incongruence, tribal issues, 
regional competition and unsettled border disputes, the climate of cooperation among the GCC 
states is not one of trust, or, as stated by O’Sullivan, ‘the GCC six aren’t ready to trust in 
regional rather than national initiatives’ (MEED 2009d).49 The GCC simply lacks suitable 
mechanisms for effective coordination and enforcement of economic policies among the 
member countries. It follows that deficiencies in interregional trade and duplication of 
industries and services are likely to continue in the foreseeable future within the region, 
thereby limiting the prospect of further diversification of the economies. 
6.2. Political barriers to the planned diversification 
The proposed reforms are politically difficult to implement, simply because large segments of 
the population in each country will experience the outcome of the reforms as a reduction of 
                                                          
49
 See also MEED (2012b), in which the status of the GCC on its thirtieth anniversary is assessed. 
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their time-honoured rights, or, as Davidson would term it, as a break with the ‘ruling bargain’ 
(Davidson 2005: 87). 
 The allocation state has pampered its nationals with cheap or free housing, land, low-
interest loans, cash hand-outs, free schooling (even abroad), attractive pensions, subsidized 
water and electricity, and freedom from taxation. In addition it has provided ample jobs for the 
nationals in the public sector. According to the plans, diversification implies – at least in the 
longer run – an economic (re)vitalization of the nationals, by reducing or withdrawing these 
highly attractive privileges in order to shift job creation to the private sector and, not least, 
redress the link between effort and reward. 
 But do the governments have the political will and the legitimacy to see through such 
wide-ranging reforms? The Arab Spring provides a tentative answer to this question. 
 Faced with the uprising during the early months of 2011, the rulers of the GCC 
countries, whether or not actual demonstrations had taken place in their countries, reacted 
nearly uniformly to quell the unrest by means of significant spending. Kuwait increased its 
governmental spending by 3 per cent of GDP by handing out a cash grant of US$3,600 per 
citizen and providing free essential food items for 18 months. In Qatar, the ruler announced a 
60 per cent increase in public sector salaries in general and a 120 per cent increase for military 
staff of officer rank, and in addition improved pensions, amounting to about 3 per cent of 
GDP. In Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah pledged two financial packages worth a total of 
US$130 billion to the Saudi population, encompassing cash hand-outs worth two months’ 
salary to all the employed and to students, public sector pay rises of 15 per cent, the 
introduction of a minimum salary, increases in unemployment benefits, the building of 
500,000 affordable housing units etc. These packages represented a value equivalent to 19 per 
cent of GDP (IMF 2011a: 16; LHV Persian Gulf Fund 2011). 
 In Bahrain and Oman – the two countries most affected, judging by the severity of 
demonstrations – the response followed the same pattern. Given their limited financial means, 
each country was granted US$10 billion from the other members of the GCC to fend off the 
storm. In Bahrain, this was translated into the creation of 20,000 public sector jobs, and in 
Oman, the response included not only the creation of 41,000 jobs in the public sector, 
increased payments for pensions and housing for students, but also the removal of twelve 
ministers (including Ahmed Macki, the minister of national economy), the abolition of the 
Ministry of National Economy, and the granting of legislative powers to the Council of Oman 
– a package worth 3–4 per cent of GDP (MEED 2011c). 
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 Most of these large expenditures were not planned in the current development plans. 
Hence the most obvious lessons that can be deduced from the responses to the Arab Spring 
uprising in relation to planning are the following.  
 First, in time of crisis, the decision makers resorted to the traditional means used by 
allocation states, namely appeasing the population by pampering them with economic gifts. 
 Second, besides being financially unsustainable, the creation of tens of thousands of 
jobs in the public sector, salary increases in the public sector and not in the private, better 
pensions and the introduction of minimum wages etc. directly contradict the intentions laid 
down in the diversification strategies, such as job creation in the private sector, levelling out 
wage differences between the private and the public sector, redressing the work–reward 
relationship and, more generally, expanding the role of the non-oil sector. 
 Third, the sheer size of the responses to the unrest reflects the fact that the regimes in 
the GCC countries perceive themselves as vulnerable. This implies that the governments will 
also be reluctant to provoke the anger of the citizens in the future. 
 So, while the regimes succeeded in deflecting the unrest and remaining in power, the 
lessons that emerge from the response to the Arab Spring uprising concerning planning are not 
encouraging. They suggest that, in time of crisis, ad hoc measures take precedence over plans, 
and, even more seriously, governments are not only ready to abandon their long-heralded 
policies of diversification, but willing to implement measures that directly contradict them. 
 It is not quite fair, however, to use the Arab Spring as a litmus test of the political 
commitment to the diversification process, or of how genuinely meaningful development 
planning and plans are in the Gulf region. The Arab Spring represented probably the most 
serious challenge the regimes in the Gulf have ever faced. The rulers had witnessed the 
turmoil in Yemen, the Tunisian president being forced out of office and the resignation of 
President Mubarak in Egypt just before the first demonstrations surfaced in Bahrain and 
Oman. These events sent a clear message to the Gulf leaders: first, that the uprising should be 
taken seriously because it could result in the downfall of their regimes, and second, that the 
messy political and economic situation in Bahrain resulting from the application of significant 
violence to curb the demonstrations should be avoided, at nearly any cost. As such, the Arab 
Spring uprising should be conceived as a national emergency situation in which all normal 
practices were set aside. 
 Thus it can be argued that in this situation of extreme threats to the regimes posed by 
the Arab Spring, the policies and plans aiming at economic diversification were momentarily 
sidelined, and if and when these societies return to a more normal situation, the emphasis on 
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pursuing the plans will be resumed. Thus the Arab Spring uprising does not foretell a 
complete abandoning or derailing of the diversification effort in the coming decade. There is 
only one certain conclusion at present, namely that the lavish spending undertaken to quell the 
Arab Spring has made the task ahead related to diversification considerably more difficult. As 
summarized by Ulrichsen (MEED 2011b), 
They can probably get away with [higher spending] for a few more years, particularly if oil 
prices remain high, but in the longer term it’s going to be fiscally unsustainable. It’s going to 
be extremely hard to roll back these measures, especially in times of unrest, so it’s just going 
to lock in government spending at incrementally higher levels. That just increases the 
eventual cost of coming to a reckoning. 
 A final issue concerning the likelihood of implementation of the planned 
diversification in the future relates to the status of the political actors who carry the plans and 
the reforms through the political system. It seems likely that the Arab Spring has boosted the 
arguments and political position of the pro-reform individuals, groups or coalitions within 
each regime. If this is so, the current plans stand a better chance of implementation, and the 
formulation of new plans will come to act as an important political battleground in the process 
of clarifying the policy aims related to diversification in the post-Arab Spring uprising period. 
6.3. Future research 
This research project raises at least two questions which would benefit from further research. 
First, there is a surprising uniformity not only in the assessment of the challenges facing the 
GCC economies, but also in the recommendations for means to meet these challenges. Are 
there really no alternative pathways for these economies? The dominant discourse seems to be 
that ‘world class’ infrastructure, education, health service, culture and leisure activities etc. 
necessarily attract and foster the emergence of a ‘creative class’ of citizens and private sector 
entrepreneurs. Is it in fact so? 
 Second, and in relation to the above, where do the meta ideas concerning the current 
comprehension of development and diversification originate, and what role do the 
international consultancy firms play in creating such ideas or transferring them to the GCC 
countries? 
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